BTU Power Company (Wael) is not opposing QIA's petition to liquidate the fund. Why? WAMo no doubt has something up his sleeve. Also, according to WAMo the petition by Qatar Investment Authority is the result of a simple "disagreement"

Summary

Wael's lawyers (FoleyHoag now, WilmerHale previously) continue to be active participants in WAM's shell game strategy, moving management contracts (for BTU Power Company as well as BTU Power Company II) around, as well as cash, and assets,etc..

WAM and his lawyers then turn around and tell the various courts that the whole saga surrounding BTU Power Company and QIA's petition to liquidate BTU Power Company is the result of a "disagreement"... [Note: excerpt below is from BTU filing in Betancourt litigation - January 27, 2012]

"A petition was filed, however, because of a disagreement over the desirability of a proposed transaction involving the fund’s portfolio of power plant assets. Under these circumstances, BTU Power Company has not opposed the winding-down of the fund."

[Note:  This last statement is very interesting.  Wael (as the sole Director of BTU Power Company could have submitted a "motion to strike the petition for winding-up" or something to that effect.  Either Wael's throwing up his arms and finally letting the investors reclaim what is rightfully theirs... Or, WAMO, Mitsue, and Simon Firth have come up with another scheme to continue playing keep away with the Middle East investors' money.]

Really!!!  Just a "Disagreement"?

According to QIA, QNB, DIB, WAM was trying to swipe their assets (CPC and TAPCO) put them into his own personal QGEN piggy-bank.  

Seems like QIA, QNB, DIB, are also not too happy about the fact that WAM swindled them out of $12-15 million (at least) playing private equity titan with his QGEN plaything. 
Etc. etc. etc. ad nauseum.   

The "Disagreement"

The following excerpt from the QIA petition to Wind-Up BTU Power Company looks more like a laundry list of corporate malfeasance!

• The Petitioners and the Supporting Preference Shareholders (as defined below) - who together represent approximately 93% of the equity in BTU Power Company ("BTU" or the "Company") - consider it is just and equitable for the Company to be wound up for at least the following reasons:
• The Manager and Almazeedi (as those terms are defined below) have conducted the business of the Company in such a way that the rights and interests of the Petitioners and the Supporting Preference Shareholders - the principal economic stakeholders in the Company — have been oppressed, disregarded and/or undermined such that it would be unjust and inequitable for them to be forced to remain as members in the Company or to be forcibly redeemed upon the terms proferred:
• The Manager and Almazeedi have consistently refused to provide the Petitioners and the Supporting Preference Shareholders with crucial information pertaining to their investments in the Company to which they are contractually entitled.
• In breach of its contractual obligations, the Company (acting through Almazeedi) refuses to allow the Petitioners to exercise their audit rights in a timely fashion, or at all.
• The relationship between the Company, Almazeedi and the Manager, on the one hand, and the Petitioners and the Supporting Preference Shareholders, on the other hand, has irretrievably broken down. The Petitioners and the Supporting Preference Shareholders have justifiably lost all confidence in Almazeedi and the Manager to manage the Company's affairs and its investments in the best interests of the Preference Shareholders.
• The Manager and Almazeedi are misusing their positions to benefit themselves to the detriment of the Company and the Preference Shareholders.
• Other than by presenting the Petition, due to their limited voting rights, the Petitioners and the Supporting Preference Shareholders have no ability to remove Almazeedi and/or the Manager.
• Since the inception of the Company, the Manager and Almazeedi have distributed to the Petitioners only US$576,000 in dividends (despite the Company's underlying assets generating substantial earnings during that time). In stark contrast during this time the Manager and Almazeedi have apparently:
• spent Company funds in an amount of approximately US$12- $15m on expenses relating to an exit or restructuring of the Company; and
• borrowed an additional US$9.3m from the Company.
• Almazeedi (or companies controlled by him) is the subject of multiple lawsuits involving other stakeholders in the BTU Group (as defined below) which include particularised allegations of serious misconduct, including self-dealing, mismanagement and corporate malfeasance, concerning Almazeedi and others employed by or connected to the BTU Group which, if substantiated, would havea material impact on the Company and the Petitioners and other Preference Shareholders' investment therein.
• The Petitioners and the Supporting Preference Shareholders believe that the Company is poised to transfer certain of the Company's assets in respect of which:
• Almazeedi has provided no evidence that the proposed transaction represents a good commercial bargain and/or is in the best interests of the Company and the Preference Shareholders, the principal economic stakeholders.
• No stakeholder consents have been obtained, or even sought.
• Almazeedi appears to have a conflict of interest.
• Almazeedi has not demonstrated that the transaction satisfies the Company's contractually mandated internal rate of return ("IRR") threshold.
• Almazeedi has incurred significant costs and expenses of approximately US$12-15m in pursuit of reorganisation and exit alternatives that he has admitted are outside the purpose of the Company, but which he has proposed should be borne by the Company.
• The Company's substratum has been lost as it no longer has any ability to require the Preference Shareholders to provide further capital due to the expiry of the mandated investment period. Without further capital, the Company cannot make additional investments in accordance with the purposes set forth in the Constituent Documents (as defined below) and it therefore seeks to restructure itself in breach of its contractual obligations and against the wishes of a significant majority of the Preference Shareholders, who hold the ultimate economic interest in the Company.
• It is abundantly clear that independent investigation of the Company's affairs by suitably qualified professionals is required on an urgent basis.